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An order was entered to cancel the sale and, to prohibit the execution
of the judgment except byleave of the court.
The court order in Gilchrist is the furthest extension of the authority conferred by CPLR 5240 to fashion the enforcement remedies
according to the circumstances in each case. 16 The judgment has not

been abolished; rather, in the name of justice its execution has been
frozen. 164 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this decision approaches
the point of divestiture of the creditor's substantive rights.
ARTICLE 71-REcovERY OF CHATTEL

CPLR 7102: Contractual waiver of the right to notice and a hearing
deemed ineffective for the ex parte seizure of certain types of property.
The "blessing of age"'1

5

has failed to obstruct recent salutary

changes in the procedural requirement of the ancient writ of replevin.
The tension between pretrial seizures of personal property and
the constitutional requirements of due process had previously caused
the courts little difficulty. Traditionally, the rationale for the constitutionality of pretrial seizures was as follows: although a person can not
be deprived of his property absent a judicial hearing, the legislature
may determine at what stage of the proceedings a hearing is required,
provided that the person is not unreasonably inconvenienced. 66
Prior to its recent amendment, 167 article 71 of New York's CPLR 68
163 See 7B McKINNY's CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 145 (1969): "[CPLR 5240] is
designed to protect judgment debtors from abuses accruing from the apparently lawful
application of article 52 devices." (Emphasis in original.) However, the Court of Appeals
has not yet passed on the scope of CPLR 5240.
164 fTjhe court can, with no more than an application of CPLR 5240, postpone the
sale for any specified time or, upon any reasonable conditions, cancel it out entirely
and give the judgment debtor a brand new chance to pay.
Nevertheless, CPLR 5240 has not been generally used.
It just seems to be a matter either of the lawyers not pressing for that section's
application, or the judges not taking it as the broad source of authority it was

intended to be.
Id.

165 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., MS5 F. Supp. 716, 723 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
168 See Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 174 (1861).
167 L. 1971, ch. 1051, at 1806-10, eff. July 2, 1971.
168 The former CPLR 7101-7112 read, in part, as follows:
7102(a) Seizure of chattel. The sheriff shall seize a chattel without delay when
the plaintiff delivers to him an affidavit, requisition and undertaking and, if an
action to recover the chattel has not been commenced, a summons and complaint.
7102(c) Affidavit. The affidavit shall dearly identify the chattel to be seized
and shall state: 1. that the plaintiff is entitled to possession by virtue of facts set
forth; 2. that the chattel is wrongfully held by the defendant named; 3. whether
an action to recover the chattel has been commenced, the defendants served...
7102(d) Requisition. The requisition shall be deemed the mandate of the
court and shall direct the sheriff of any county where the chattel is found to
seize the chattel described in the affidavit.
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was typical of most replevin statutes. It provided for the seizure of a
chattel by the sheriff when a plaintiff in replevin delivered an affidavit,
requisition, and undertaking to him. 169 If the plaintiff had not yet
commenced an action to recover the chattel, he also had to deliver a
summons and complaint to the sheriff.170 The sheriff of any county
where the chattel was found was authorized to break open a building
or enclosure in order to seize the chattel. 171 While the requisition was
"deemed the mandate of the court,' 1

72

in reality, it was issued without

any intervening examination by the court; in effect, it was the mandate
of the plaintiff's attorney. 1 73 "No prior notice to the persons holding
the chattel was necessary, and the seizure was deemed to be merely a
1 74
preliminary step in the replevin action."'
The constitutional adequacy of such a statute had never really
been questioned, perhaps in part because of its ancient tradition. However, with the rise of the consumer-credit industry, it became apparent
that such statutes could be overly lender-oriented. The initial congressional and legislative reactions to the developing inequity focused,
primarily, on requiring the lender to make full disclosures to the consumer. Little attempt was made to protect the consumer once the
debtor-creditor relationship had been established. 75
7110. If a chattel is secured or concealed in a building or enclosure and it is
not delivered pursuant to his demand, the sheriff shall cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and shall take the chattel into his possession.
The pertinent parts of the amendment read as follows:
7102(a) Seizure of chattel. When the plaintiff delivers to a sheriff an affidavit,
order of seizure and undertaking and, if-an action to recover a chattel has not
been commenced, a summons and complaint, he shall seize the chattel in accordance with the provisions of the order and without delay.
7102(c) Affidavit. The affidavit . . . shall state: 5. if the plaintiff seeks the
inclusion in the order of seizure of a provision authorizing the sheriff to break
open, enter and search for the chattel in the place where the chattel may be,
facts sufficient under the due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States to authorize the inclusion in the
order of such a provision.
7102(d) Order of seizure. 1. Upon presentation of the affidavit and undertaking and upon such terms as may be required to conform to the due process
of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the
United States, the court shall grant an order directing the sheriff of any county
where the chattel is found to seize the chattel described in the affidavit and
including, if the court so directs, a provision that, if the chattel is not delivered
to the sheriff, he may break open, enter and search for the chattel in the place
where the chattel may be.
2. If the order of seizure does not include the [above] provision . . . . the
court shall grant a restraining order that the chattel shall not be removed . . .
or otherwise disposed of ... until further order of the court.
169 Former CPLR 7102(a).
170 Id.
-71Id. 7110.
172

Id. 7102(d).

173 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
174 Finkenberg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez, 166 N.Y.L.J. 28, Aug. 10, 1971, at 10,

col. 1 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
175 See Note, ProvisionalRemedies in New York Reapprised under Sniadach v. Family

1971]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

The major breakthrough came in Sniadach v. Family Finance
77
Corp. 170 There the Supreme Court dealt with a Wisconsin statute
which allowed prejudgment garnishment of wages without notice or a
hearing. The Court pointed out:
We deal here with wages - a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system....
A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking
which may impose 78tremendous hardship on wage earners with
families to support
Absent notice and a prior hearing, the deprivation of property was
"so obvious" that no extended argument was deemed necessary in
order to conclude that "this prejudgment garnishment procedure vio79
late[d] the fundamental principles of due process.'
While some courts have construed Sniadach to be applicable
only to wages as a specialized type of property, 1 0 the more realistic
approach is exemplified by the holding in Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co.' 8 ' In Laprease, the defendant-creditor, pursuant to the
New York statute, attempted to seize various items of household furnishings purchased by the plaintiff, a welfare mother with an ill husband
and ten children, who was unable to make the necessary payments. A
three-judge district court, noting that
[b]eds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables and other necessaries for
ordinary day-to-day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a 'specialized
type of property . . . ' the taking of which on the unilateral
command of an adverse party 'may impose tremendous hardships'
on purchasers of these essentials, 82
held that the prejudgment seizure of chattel without notice and a
Finance Corp.: A ConstitutionalFly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 426

(1970).
176 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For an extended discussion of Sniadach, see Note, Provisional
Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Constitu.
tional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 426 (1970); Note, Some Implica-

tions of Sniadach, 70 COLUm. L. Rav. 942 (1970); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to
Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related
Areas of Law, 68 Micn. L. REV. 986 (1970).
1771WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (West Supp. 1971). The sections overturned were
§§ 267.04(1), 267.07(1), and 267.18(2)(a).
178 395 U.S. at 340.
1791d. at 342.

180 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J&P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Fuentes v.
Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob furis, noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971); Young
v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
181 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). The limitation of Sniadach to wages is inconsistent with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which held that New York's procedure
for terminating welfare payments without notice or a hearing was a denial of procedural
due process.
182 315 F. Supp. at 722.
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hearing under article 71 was a clear violation of the procedural due
83
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
The Laprease court did not have to face a subsidiary problem
posed in most of the cases which have construed Sniadach narrowly.
The case involved debtors who, by virtue of a conditional sales contract, had authorized creditors to seize the goods sold upon their default. While the validity of a contractual waiver of fourteenth amendment rights was doubted in Laprease,184 some courts have been
reluctant to dispose of the contractual waiver as ineffectual or incompetent. Indeed, the contractual waiver problem may be the most
significant barrier to the expansion of due process requirements in
the consumer-credit area. Thus, in Fuentes v. Faircloth,8 5 a three-judge
district court held that Florida's replevin statute,8 8 under which a
conditional seller repossessed goods without a hearing in accordance
with contract terms, did not violate the requirements of due process.
The court declined to interfere with the contractual freedom of the
parties.
However, since the requirements of procedural due process are
predicated on a balancing of interests, 8 7 there is little reason to doubt
that such a balance can be struck between the interests of the consumer
and the business sector. This balancing of interests is exemplified by
two recent New York decisions, the first decisions dealing with the
amended article 71 mandated by Laprease-Wellbilt Equipment Corp.
183 The Laprease court also held that CPLR 7102 and 7110 were violative of the
fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. For discussion of this aspect of the case,
see 22 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 342 (1971); 19 KAN. L. REv. 281 (1971); 55 MINN. L. Rav. 634
(1971).
184 Further, we question that the fine print in the usual consumers conditional
sales contract gives rise to a competent and intelligent waiver of a constitutional

right.
315 F. Supp. at 724. A contractual provision permitting repossession upon default presents
at least two questions: (1) whether the provision constitutes a waiver of constitutional
rights, and (2) if-so, whether it is a competent waiver. See, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1971).
185 317 F. Supp. 954 (SpD. Fla. 1970), prob. furis. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
186 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.21 (Supp. 1971). The sections challenged were §§ 78.01,
78.04, 78.07, 78.08, 78.10, 78.11, and 78.12.
187 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring):
[Due process] is a delicate process of adjustment....
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives
to the procedure that was followed, . . . the balance of hurt complained of and
good accomplished . . . are some of the considerations that must enter into the
judicial judgment.
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v. La Creme Bakery s88 and Finkenberg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez. 189
Basically, the decisions reflect two primary considerations: (1) the
type of property sought to be repossessed and, hence, the hardship
likely to be caused thereby, and (2) the comparative standing of the
parties.
In Wellbilt, the plaintiff sought an ex parte order to seize an airconditioning unit which he had bought at an auction of a restaurant.
The defendant had purchased a lease of the restaurant, and, negotiating
for the purchase of the air-conditioner himself, he had refused to allow
the plaintiff to take possession of the unit. The court, noting that
[t]he instant application does not present the type of hardship to the
defendant which was envisioned in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture or in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,190
consequently restrained the defendant from removing or disposing of
the equipment and directed the marshal to seize the property five days
after the defendant was served with a copy of the court order and the
paper upon which the order was granted.
When the Wellbilt decision is read in conjunction with Finkenberg, it becomes apparent that implicit in the former was the realization that there was no fundamental disparity between the parties in
their respective abilities to comprehend their rights and to uphold
them.19'
In Finkenberg,the court denied the plaintiff-furniture company's
request for an order to seize, without prior notice, a five-piece bedroom
set and a television purchased by the defendants under two installment
contracts authorizing repossession in the event of default. In discussing
some of the factors which led to Sniadach, the court pointed out:
[In the course of the development of credit installment sales] ... ,
replevin was distorted into a mere collection device, with the sheriff
or marshal becoming an arm of the creditor. Most debtors, under
these circumstances, were either too poor, or too ignorant to enforce
their rights. As a result, great hardships were all too often imposed
upon persons who were the least equipped to withstand such dire
circumstances.19 2
The court distinguished between property, the seizure of which
188 166 N.Y.LJ. 24, Aug. 4, 1971, at 12, col. 2 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
189 Id. 28, Aug. 10, 1971, at 10, col. 1 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County). Both decisions
were by Judge Evans.
190 Id. 24, at 12, col. 3.
191 Id.
192 Id. 28, at 10, coL 2.
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would probably cause great personal hardship, and commercial or
industrial property. The court stressed that the presence of a waiver
of constitutional protections in a typical consumer contract of adhesion' 93 is "without such effect."'"
Because of the type of property and possible hardship involved and
indications that the defendant might not be able to comprehend his
rights, the court directed the company, contractual stipulations notwithstanding, to notify the defendant of a scheduled hearing date. The
defendants were temporarily enjoined from disposing of the property
and were required to account for their default.
The approach taken in these two cases is preferable to limiting
Sniadach to wages and upholding the contractual waiver of a debtor's
fourteenth amendment rights. As noted previously, 195 the view that
Sniadach is applicable only to wages has already been undermined.
Failure to acknowledge the injustice of treating all consumers as copowers with their creditors can only perpetuate the very inequities
which Sniadach was designed to dissolve. The flexibility and fairness
embodied in the Finkenberg and Wellbilt decisions deserve favorable
Supreme Court consideration when that tribunal ultimately resolves
these issues.
ARTICLE 75-ARBITRATION

CPLR 7501: Article 75 held applicable to advisory arbitration.
CPLR 7501 provides for the enforcement of written agreements
to arbitrate future or existing controversies without regard to the
justiciable nature of the controversy. In determining whether a right
to arbitrate exists, the court is not authorized to consider the merits of
the dispute. 190 "The only pertinent questions are (I) whether there is
a dispute; (2) whether there is a contract to arbitrate; and (3) whether
there is a refusal to arbitrate."' 97
193 See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some

Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,

43 COLuM. L. Rav. 629, 632 (1943):
The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position
to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly ... or because all competitors use the same clauses. His
contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary [sic] to terms
dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood
only in a vague way, if at all.
Quoted in 166 N.Y.L.J. 28, at 10, col. 4.
194 166 N.Y.LJ. 28, at 10, col. 4. See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
195 See note 181 supra and accompanying text.

196See, e.g., Empire State Master Hairdressers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers
Local 17-A, 18 App. Div. 2d 808, 809, 236 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (2d Dep't 1963).
197 Greene Steel & Wire Co. v. F.W. Hartmann & Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1962), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 683, 247 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't 1964), appeal

